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extensions. The opinion states that although a landlord is willing to give an
option to purchase for a limited period, the considerations for such an agree-
ment cannot sustain a twenty-year interval. Without specific reference other-
wise, the landlord's intention will be deemed only to grant the purchase option
for the life of the lease wherein it is contained:
Although the landlord may be content for a fixed time to be bound
to a fixed price, it is another matter altogether to say that the option
is to continue for an extended period unless clear words are used for
that purpose." (Emphasis supplied.)
The decision is a proper one. What is an option? It is simply a purchase
of time during which the party securing it may be assured the property will
not be disposed of by the landlord. This both protects his desire to purchase
and allows him an opportunity to consider all the facets of the property in
determining whether the purchase will be advantageous. Certainly such an
option is an added inducement to the lessee to rent. However, the extra
consideration, clearly is to run only for the term specified, and in absence of
a specification, for the term of the lease. This is necessarily so, for the con-
sideration received for granting the option is the signing of the lease which is
extinguished at the termination of the term. It is improbable that a property
owner, especially if he is a businessman, will create a situation where his
property can be purchased for a specific price indefinitely. The value of land
fluctuates and the factors prompting such an offer change with such rapidity,
that such a contract could prove almost ridiculous. The conclusion of the Court
reflects this common intention by validating the simple extension agreements,
which are less arduous and less expensive, while declaring the agreements do
not apply to all the stipulations of the original contract, unless they are
specifically referred to in the contract. This holding and these added considera-
tions do not advocate a rule which would make a long term purchase option
clause in a lease or the extension of it impossible. They simply attempt to
prevent a court or the parties from misconstruing the intention of the parties
making such an agreement by requiring them to be explicit, when their motives
are not obvious upon scrutinizing the document, or when their intention varies
from general contracts of this type.
G.S.L.
WARRANTIES OF MANUFACTURER CONCERNING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
or GENERATING UNITS DECLARED NOT PROSPECTIVE IN NATURE
A generator manufacturer sold separately two sets of generating units to
a utility company for the latter's use at its generating plants. The manufacturer
orally guaranteed that "the sets were so designed and constructed that with
7. Sherwood v. Tucker, 2 Ch. 440 (1924).
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normal operation they would last 30 years," and it impliedly warranted that
"the sets would be capable of continuous operation at full rated capacity for
the usual life span of 30 years." 1 The first set (hereafter called the Newport
set) was put into operation at Newport, Vermont in December 1948. A second
set was installed in plaintiff's plant at Nogales, Arizona (hereafter called the
Nogales set), and controversy arose almost immediately concerning the capacity
and suitability of this set. The utility company instituted proceedings in a
federal court, whereupon both parties agreed to a series of tests to be con-
ducted by engineers of both companies. The results of these tests formed the
basis for a settlement agreement by which the utility company accepted the
Nogales set in its original condition and the manufacturer reduced the unpaid
balance by a considerable sum. Subsequently other defects were found in the
Nogales set and similar defects were then found in the Newport set, which
had been installed more than six years beforehand. The utility company sued,
joining several causes of action. On appeal from a dismissal of all causes of
action, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting in part, one judge concurring in
part only. Because the settlement agreement was complete on its face and there
was no showing of fraud in its inducement, it was a bar to future suits upon the
Nogales contract. Furthermore, since an action was not begun until after the
statute of limitations had elapsed, the suit for defects in the Newport set was
barred. Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d. 409,
184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).2
Generally, warranties, both express and implied, are only applicable to
the present condition of the goods. Therefore, as Professor Williston has de-
clared, "The representation (that a machine will work well for a certain number
of years) means that the machine as it stands is so well constructed as to be
capable of enduring use for that period."13 If the warranties only apply to present
conditions, defects in merchandise are considered to be discoverable upon
delivery, and a cause of action arising out of the sale accrues at the time the
sale is completed.4 Therefore, in New York a suit upon a cause of action based
on a present warranty must be instituted within six years, the statutory limit
applicable to such warranties, after the sale is completed.5 However, there is
an exception to the general rule. "If the seller promises that something shall
happen or shall not happen to the goods within a specified time, the promise
though it may be called a warranty cannot be broken until that time has
elapsed and until then the statute [of limitations] will not begin to run."6 The
1. Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 184
N.E.2d 171, 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198 (1962).
2. Citizens Utilities Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 15 A.D.2d 473, 222 N.Y.S.2d
246 (1st Dep't 1961).
3. 1 Williston, Sales, § 212, p. 549, n.5 (rev. ed. 1948).
4. Liberty Mut. v. Sheila-Lynn Inc., 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't
1946) (mem.), affirming 185 Misc. 689, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(1).
6. 1 Williston, Sales, op. cit., § 212(a), p. 550.
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only New York case recognizing this exception is Woodworth v. Rice Bros.7
There the seller warranted that the saplings he sold would bear Elberta and
Willet peaches; however, several years later, the trees bore peaches of a
different variety. The Court there held that since the guarantee related entirely
to the future and because the buyer could not know in advance what variety
of peach the tree would bear, the statute of limitations began to run at the time
the tree bore the fruit and not at the time of the completion of the sale.
The Court in the instant case held that the sweeping broadness of the
settlement agreement conclusively barred the plaintiff from suing for defects
in the Nogales set. It further declared that the rule barring parol evidence pre-
vented any suit upon the defendant's oral representations as to the Newport
set. The only problem left to decide was whether the implied warranty pertain-
ing to the Newport set was prospective in nature. Declaring that "where the
warranty is as to kind, characteristics, suitability, etc., of the sold article the
limitation runs from the date of sale and present inability to ascertain quality or
condition is irrelevant,"8 the Court concluded that warranties as to design and
construction merely relate to present suitability. Taking cognizance of the
possible difficulties of discovering defects and the unfairness which might
result, the Court concluded that such unfairness was inherent in the statute
of limitations. The dissent was disturbed by the consequences of the Court's
holding, believing that it gave manufacturers a distinct advantage over pur-
chasers by allowing manufacturers to rely upon the statute of limitations to
relieve them of their own warranties.
This decision is important because it relieves manufacturers from responsi-
bility after a prescribed length of time and puts a definite burden on the
purchaser to discover all defects within that time. Although Woodworth only
involved an express warranty, courts in foreign jurisdictions have recognized
that implied warranties may also be prospective in nature.9 Logically, the
Court, by extending its holding in the Woodworth case, might have done like-
wise. Unlike the case of fruit trees, however, it appears that defects in this
type of machinery are discoverable within six years, especially since utility
companies maintain large staffs of engineers who design, operate, and test
machinery. For this reason, the Court was correct in placing this particular
case outside the narrow limits of prospective warranties. However, machinery
exists today in which defects are virtually impossible to detect readily and
whose expected life is longer than the statute of limitations. Certainly an
extension of the Woodworth rule would be permissible in these circumstances.
R.B.S.
7. 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922), affirming 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y.S. 958
(4th Dep't 1920), affirming 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
8. Citizens Utilities Co, v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 184 N.E.2d
171, 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198 (1962).
9. E.g., Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897 (1961).
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